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The Nordic development assistance programs have earned a reputation for 
commitment to human rights and democracy. Is the reputation deserved? We address 
this question by comparing how much aid donors give and to which recipient 
countries. Using a global panel data set, spanning the period 1980-99 and 91 recipient 
countries, we find that individual bilateral donors vary considerably from one another. 
Nordic aid distribution differs significantly from other bilateral aid donor patterns: 
Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland provide more aid to democracies but do not 
penalise poor trade policies. Unlike other bilateral donors the four Nordics do not 
provide more aid to political allies. We also find some evidence that recipients with a 





International aid agencies are motivated by different objectives. For example, 
NORAD, the Norwegian aid agency states: 
￿The purpose of Norwegian development cooperation is to contribute 
towards lasting improvements in economic, social and political 
conditions for the populations of developing countries, with particular 
emphasis on ensuring that development aid benefits the poorest 
people.￿ 
Furthermore, one of the main goals is ￿To contribute towards promoting peace, 
democracy and human rights￿.
1 Many other international aid agencies state the 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals as their main objective. Denmark, 
Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and other donors state explicitly that aid is aimed 
at reducing global poverty. However, other aid agencies seem to be at least partly 
motivated by self-interest. USAID￿s mission statement makes this explicit: 
￿U.S. foreign assistance has always had the twofold purpose of 
furthering America’s foreign policy interests in expanding democracy 




 In this paper we examine the patterns of aid allocation across different donor 
countries. The consensus is that strategic interests, colonial history, trade, and political 
institutions of the recipient country dominate bilateral aid (most recent studies include 
Alesina and Dollar (2000), Boschini and Olofsg￿rd (2001) and Neumayer (2003)). 
The Nordic donors, however, tend to be regarded as exceptions. One problem in the 
existing literature is that the Nordic countries, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and 
Finland are usually aggregated in the analysis and to date no systematic examination 
of Nordic aid distribution patterns has been made. 
Using comprehensive OECD data on aid disbursements during the period 
1980 to 1999, we compare bilateral aid flows, focusing in particular on the individual 
Nordic countries. Like previous studies we find that there are profound differences 
                                                 
1 http://www.norad.no 
2 http://www.usaid.gov between the specific political factors that shape different countries￿ aid allocation 
patterns. Our results indicate that the aid allocation patterns of the Nordic countries 
are not the same as those of other bilateral aid agencies. We find strong evidence that 
Nordic donors provide more aid to the poorest countries and to democracies but do 
not penalise countries with less open trade policies. We also find some indication that 
recipients with a good human rights record receive more aid from Nordic donors. 
The paper is organized as follows: after a brief review of previous research 
regarding the distribution of aid we present some descriptive data focusing on Nordic 
countries. In Section 3 we use a global panel data set for our regression analysis for a 
comparison of individual donor aid allocations. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data Description ￿ Patterns of Aid Allocation 
 
2.1  Global Patterns of Bilateral Aid Allocation 
A number of studies have examined the patterns of aid allocation (see, for example, 
McKinley and Little, 1978; McKinley and Little, 1979; Mosely, 1981; Maizels and 
Nissanke, 1984; Trumbull and Wall, 1994; Ludborg, 1998; Schraeder, et al., 1998; 
Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Boschini and Olofsg￿rd, 2001; 
Collier and Dollar, 2002; Neumayer, 2003). With few exceptions most analyses of 
bilateral aid allocations show that political and strategic interests of donors trump 
concern for growth or poverty reduction. The Nordic countries, however, tend to stand 
out as exceptions. The problem is that for most analyses the Nordics are aggregated
3 
and no systematic examination of individual Nordic donors￿ allocation patterns has 
been made. Alesina and Dollar conclude that in the aggregate Nordic donors provide 
the right incentives; more aid goes to poor recipients with good trade policies and 
open democratic regimes. This may be partly due to historical reasons, Nordic donors 
have no colonial legacies and since all of the four donors are small countries they do 
not try to foster global strategic interests.  Furthermore, all Nordic donors have a 
tradition of a social democratic welfare state where all citizens are entitled to welfare. 
This principle of universality generates a shared conception of citizenship and social 
spending is comparatively high in Nordic countries. Moreover, this system of socio-
                                                 
3 Alesina and Dollar (2000) even include the Netherlands and Canada in their aggregation. political values does not only provide the determinants for domestic but also for 
international justice. Foreign aid can thus be seen as an extension of the principles of 
the welfare state beyond the domestic borders.
4 Noºl and ThØrien (1995) suggest in 
their empirical study that states with large welfare budgets are more generous in 
providing foreign aid. Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden are among the 
welfare states with large aid budgets, however, this correlation does not hold for 
Finland, Switzerland and France. 
We now turn to a description of Nordic aid allocation before we present a 
detailed regression analysis of the factors that determine this allocation in section 3.  
 
2.2 Nordic Patterns of Bilateral Aid Allocation 
Throughout this paper we use the definition of aid as used by the OECD and base all 
of our empirical work on their data. The OECD provides online information on the aid 
flows from bilateral and multilateral donors to recipient countries. In our analysis we 
included official development assistance (ODA) to developing countries as well as 
official aid (OA) to the so called "Part II" countries which include more advanced 
developing countries as well as Central and Eastern European Countries and Newly 
Independent States of the former Soviet Union (CEEC and NIS).
5 Data are available 
from 1960 and is provided in current US dollars. In this paper we analyse the total net 
ODA/OA flows for the period 1980-99.  Total ODA/OA includes grants or loans to 
countries that are undertaken by the official sector in order to promote economic 
development and welfare. The financial terms are concessional; if the ODA/OA 
consists of a loan it must have a grant element of at least 25 per cent. While technical 
co-operation is included, grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. 
For most years the flows are positive, however, due to the re-payments of loans the 
flows are negative for some years. 
Using the US GDP deflator we calculate aid flows in constant 1995 dollars. In 
this section we concentrate on the average taken over the years 1997, 1998 and 1999 
in order to smooth out any unusual events. The pattern of aid allocation by donors is 
shown in Table I. Bilateral aid from the 22 Development Assistance Committee 
                                                 
4 For a detailed discussion see Stokke (1989). 
5 For a detailed list please refer to the Appendix. The concepts of ODA and OA are the same -- they 
only differ in the type of recipient country. (DAC) member countries
6 accounts for the largest share, 65.4 percent, of total global 
aid. About 45 percent of total aid originates from only four countries: Japan (17.3 
percent), USA (9.2 percent), France (9 percent) and Germany (7.5 percent). The 
Nordic donors contribute considerably less in absolute terms; nevertheless, Denmark, 
Sweden and Norway contribute each between 2.5 and 2.9 percent of total global aid. 
Multilateral aid agencies give 33.6 percent. The remaining two percent of total global 
aid that is not from a DAC country or a multilateral organization are accounted for by 
bilateral Arab donors. 
Relative to their GDP, donors differ hugely in their generosity
7. As column 4, 
Table I shows only four countries exceed the UN target of 0.7 percent of Gross 
National Income (GNI) and three of these four are Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 
Denmark’s ODA to GNI ratio was 0.99 percent, while Norway￿s was 0.87 percent, 
and Sweden￿s was 0.74 percent.  
We now examine who receives this aid. In Table II we list the major recipients 
of Nordic Aid. For Norway topping the list are Tanzania and Mozambique, receiving 
7.1 percent and 6.9 percent of Norwegian aid, respectively. Other important recipients 
are the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Zambia and Bangladesh. Sweden 
allocates the largest share to Tanzania (6.8 percent) and Mozambique (about 6 
percent) followed by South Africa (about 5 percent).  Much of Danish aid is also 
allocated to Sub-Saharan Africa. Top of the list are Tanzania (8.8 percent), Uganda 
(7.8 percent) and Mozambique (5.3 percent). Finland￿s allocation is somewhat 
different, neighbouring Russia heads the list (9.3 percent), followed by China (8.2 
percent) and Mozambique (6.7 percent). The Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina also feature prominently. Estonia just makes it into the top ten, receiving 
3.8 percent of Finnish aid. To summarize, much of Norwegian, Danish and Swedish 
aid is allocated to Sub-Saharan African countries; for each donor six out of the top ten 
recipients are in Sub-Saharan Africa. Finland￿s aid allocation seems to be more 
dominated by regional concerns. Russia and Estonia are among the top ten recipients, 
while only two Sub-Saharan countries receive considerable amounts of aid 
(Mozambique and Tanzania). 
                                                 
6 A list of the 22 DAC countries is listed in the Appendix. 
7 Hopkins (2000) provides a detailed discussion of aid volumes over time. Recently, donors have been encouraged to coordinate bi-lateral aid in the 
recipient countries in order to improve aid efficiency and public service delivery 
(World Bank, 2004). Furthermore, tied aid is now widely regarded as being more of 
an aid for the donor country than for the recipient countries and channelling aid 
through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has been seen as preferable to 
giving aid to corrupt governments. In Table III we examine how much aid is 
channelled through multilateral organisations and through NGOs, how much is 
provided in grants and how much tied aid each Nordic donor provides. In each case 
we compare this with the average of the 22 DAC donors.  
The average DAC country gives about two thirds of ODA directly to the 
recipient countries and channels about one third through multilateral agencies. 
Norway and Sweden provides a relatively high proportion of ODA bilaterally, 74 and 
70 percent, respectively. Thus, less than the average is channelled through 
multinational organizations. Denmark and Finland in contrast spend a lower than 
average proportion of their ODA on bilateral aid, 59 and 58 percent, respectively. The 
average DAC country provides about 90 percent of its aid as grants, for all Nordic 
countries this is considerably higher, just under 100 percent. About one quarter of all 
DAC aid is provided as tied aid. Among the Nordic donors, Denmark provides a 
relatively high proportion of ODA as tied aid (29 percent), followed by Finland (15 
percent). The other two Nordic donors tie very little of their bilateral aid, Norway 
only provides one percent as tied aid, while Sweden provides about two percent. 
Interestingly, Nordic donors, with the exception of Sweden, channel negligible 
amounts of aid through NGOs. 
In order to complete our brief overview of Nordic aid we examine the 
allocation by major purpose in Table IV. Traditionally much of aid has been provided 
as project aid, often in an attempt to address the issues of fungibility and to provide 
show cases for donor involvement.
8 However, programme aid can help to strengthen 
ownership of reform in selected countries and reduce the cost of collaboration 
between donor and recipient (World Bank, 2004). Comparing the major purposes of 
aid commitments we see that all of the Nordic donors provide more aid for social and 
administrative infrastructure, but less aid for economic infrastructure than the average 
DAC donor. Within the provision of social infrastructure all Nordic donors put a 
                                                 
8 Mosley and Eeckhout (2000) discuss project and programme aid. particular emphasis on the provision of health care. All Nordics provide free access to 
health care in their countries and may thus have a particular motivation and expertise 
in providing basic health care in recipient countries. All of the Nordic donors provide 
less programme assistance than the average DAC donor (7 percent); Norway only 
provides 0.5 percent as programme assistance. 
Our brief overview provides us with a number of stylised facts regarding 
contemporary aid distribution. Multilateral agencies provide one third of the total 
global aid budget and four large donors provide about 54 percent of total global aid. 
Nordic countries may be comparatively small donors in total aid terms but are very 
generous in providing aid. Denmark, Sweden and Norway are among the few donors 
who fulfil the UN target of giving more than 0.7 percent of their GNI as aid. Much of 
Nordic aid goes to Sub-Saharan Africa, with the notable exception of Finland. Much 
of Finnish aid is allocated to the neighbouring Russia and Estonia. Nordic countries 
provide a larger than average share of aid as grants. With the exception of Denmark 
very little aid is tied. Apart from Sweden hardly any aid is channelled through NGOs. 
All Nordic donors tend to concentrate on the provision of social infrastructure rather 
than economic infrastructure, a relatively large proportion is provided for health care.  
Nordic donors prefer project aid to programme aid. In order to examine these 
differences in aid allocation in more detail, we now turn to regression analysis in 
Section 3.  
 
 
3. Data Analysis 
We analyse the global allocation of aid during 1980-1999 by using averages for five 
year sub periods, 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94 and 1995-99. We are able to estimate 
the aid allocation to 91 recipient countries. However, we do not have information for 
all countries for all years, making this global panel unbalanced. We estimate our 
model by pooled OLS and report robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of aid given by a particular donor or a group of donors.
9 As explanatory 
                                                 
9 Following the standard practice in this literature we added a small amount of aid to all observations, 
thus avoiding missing values when taking the logarithm of the zero observations. As an alternative 
treatment of the zero values we used Tobit estimation and found the results to be qualitatively similar. 
Results presented in Table VII. variables we use a range of socio-economic characteristics of recipient countries, as 
well as their history and geo-strategic importance. The results are shown in Table V. 
In the first two columns we investigate the donor behaviour of the multinational 
versus bilateral donors. Here we summed the total aid given by all multi-lateral 
agencies and for the bilateral aid we summed the total aid given by the 22 DAC 
countries. The results suggest that the aid allocation of multi- and bilateral donors is 
relatively similar. The effect of income is negative, donors give more aid to poorer 
countries.
10 Countries with large populations also receive more aid. We use the 
parallel market premium as an indicator of trade policy. Repressive trade regimes are 
characterized by a higher premium, but it can also be argued that generally poor 
macro-economic management causes a higher premium. We think that this proxy of 
trade policies is a suitable one because it allows us to analyse macroeconomic policies 
in general. In any case it is preferable to a dummy categorizing open or closed trade 
regime because this continuous variable allows us to consider different degrees of 
openness. For multi- as well as bi-lateral donors the coefficient on trade policy is 
insignificant. We measure democracy using the Polity IV data set which measures 
openness of political institutions on a scale of 1 to 10, with higher values indicating 
more democratic regimes (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995). Democracy is significant at the 
ten percent level, more democratic countries receive more aid. We also include a 
measure of human rights violations which is based on information published by 
Amnesty International. The index (as compiled by Cornett and Gibney, 2004) runs 
from 1 to 5, with higher values indicating worse human rights. Our democracy and 
human rights variables are not highly correlated; the correlation coefficient is only  
-0.06. Thus, democracy and the human rights variable seem to measure different 
aspects of political rights. The human rights index is not significant, (i.e. neither 
multilateral nor bilateral donors seem to take human rights into account when 
allocating aid). With respect to regional allocation multi- and bilateral donors are 
somewhat different. While both give more to Egypt, the multilateral donors give 
significantly less to Israel while the bilateral donors give significantly more to Israel. 
                                                 
10 Like Alesina and Dollar (2000) we also ran specifications with a squared income term. Although we 
find both the level and the squared term to be significant we decided not to report these results because 
the inflexion point was outside the sample range.  Thus, we conclude that the often hypothesized curvi-
linear relationship is not relevant for any of the recipient countries included in our analysis. Neither donor group gives more aid to Latin American nor to Sub-Saharan African 
countries; these dummies are insignificant. Religion does not seem to be a very 
important determinant either. Countries with higher proportions of Catholics or 
Muslim populations are no different than other countries; the coefficients are 
insignificant. However, countries with a higher proportion of Protestants receive less 
aid. To summarize, when looking at aggregates multi- and bilateral donors allocate 
aid according to income, population and democracy. Egypt receives more aid than 
other countries, ceteris paribus. Human rights and trade policies do not seem to be 
important factors in the global allocation of aid. Our model is provides a better 
explanation for multilateral aid (R
2=0.59) than for bilateral aid (R
2=0.42). 
A comparison of the aid allocation patterns of Nordic donors to the previous 
bilateral donors suggests that Nordic donors follow a somewhat different pattern. In 
column 3 we consider the total aid given by Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
The income effect is negative and larger countries receive more aid. This conforms to 
the general pattern of bilateral aid allocation although the descriptive statistics 
indicating that Nordic donors allocate a lot of aid to smaller countries. The coefficient 
on the parallel market premium is positive, i.e. countries with closed trade policies 
receive more aid. Countries with higher democracy scores receive more aid and 
countries with worse human rights records receive less aid. Egypt receives more aid, 
ceteris paribus. The Israel dummy is negative at the ten percent level. Our descriptive 
statistics in section 2 seemed to suggest that Nordic donors give a lot of aid to Sub-
Saharan African countries; however, the region as a whole does not receive 
preferential treatment when we account for a number of country specific 
characteristics. The Latin America dummy is also insignificant. Countries with higher 
proportions of Protestants, Catholics and Muslims receive less aid. Our model 
provides a reasonable fit (R
2 =0.52). 
In columns 4-7 we investigate the four Nordic donors separately. Like in the 
previous models the coefficient on the income term is negative and highly significant. 
Nordic donors allocate more aid to poorer countries. Like the other DAC donors all 
Nordic donors give more to large countries. All Nordics give more aid to countries 
with poor trade policies but also to more democratic regimes. Only Denmark gives 
less aid to countries with poor human rights, this variable is not significant for the 
other three donors. Egypt receives significantly more aid from Denmark, Sweden and 
Finland. Israel receives significantly less aid from Norway, Denmark and Finland. Sub-Saharan Africa does not receive more aid but Denmark and Finland allocate 
significantly less to Latin American countries. Norway, Denmark and Finland give 
less aid to countries with high proportions of Protestants, Catholics and Muslims. For 
Sweden, none of the religious variables are significant. We also introduce an index of 
political allegiance between the donor country and the recipients. Using UN voting 
patterns, Gartzke and Jo (2000) derive an index from -1 to 1 with higher values 
indicating more similar voting patterns. With respect to this UN variable none of the 
Nordic donors give more aid to political allies. To summarize, unlike the average 
bilateral donor, Nordic donors allocate aid according to democracy and human rights 
records but not to political allies. Countries with poor trade policies receive more aid, 
ceteris paribus. In general, the model seems more suited to explain the Norwegian 
and Danish allocation than the Swedish and Finnish one. 
Our model also provides a good explanation of the aid allocation by the big 
five bilateral donors (USA, UK, France, Japan and Germany) and for the Netherlands 
and Canada. We present these results in columns 9 to 15. All donors give more aid to 
larger countries. The parallel market premium is significantly negative for the US and 
Japan, i.e. countries with less open policies receive less aid. In contrast, France, the 
Netherlands and Canada give more aid to poor trade policy countries. The US, the 
UK, Germany and the Netherlands allocate more aid to democracies; France, Japan 
and Canada do not. However, Japan and Canada give less aid to countries with poor 
human rights; this variable is insignificant for all the other donors. All donors without 
exception allocate more aid to recipients who are their political allies with respect to 
UN voting patterns. Recipients also tend to receive more aid if they are former 
colonies. Obviously, geo-strategic interests vary across donors but Egypt receives 
more aid from all donors apart from the UK. Israel receives more aid from the USA, 
Germany and the Netherlands but less from the UK and Japan. Sub-Saharan African 
countries receive less aid from Japan and Latin American countries receive more aid 
from the Netherlands and Canada but less from the UK. Catholic countries receive 
more aid from France and less aid from Japan and Canada. Protestant and Muslim 
countries tend to receive less aid across the donors. The model explains the aid 
allocation of France (R
2=0.72) and the UK (R
2=0.66) particularly well and least well 
for the US (R
2=0.46). 
When we compare the aid allocation for individual donors we can thus 
observe distinct patterns. All of the donors provide more aid to poor countries. Two donors (US and Japan) give less aid to recipients with poor trade policies. Some 
donors allocate more aid to democracies and Japan as well as Canada give less aid to 
regimes with poor human rights records. However, all of these donors give more aid 
to former colonies and to their UN-friends.  
The patterns for the Nordic countries (Norway, Denmark, Sweden and 
Finland) are distinct. All Nordic donors give more aid to democracies and in the 
aggregate they give less aid to recipients with poor human rights. UN voting 
behaviour seems to be insignificant in their allocation decisions. However, poor trade 
policies are not penalised, countries with poor trade policies receive more aid.  
A recent debate in the World Bank regards the LICUS, Low Income Countries 
under Stress.
11 These countries are very poor, have epidemic diseases, organized 
crime, some are experiencing civil war or a war has just recently ended. The term 
LICUS is currently applied to a large variety of countries, some are resource rich but 
policy poor (Angola), some have exceptionally weak government capacity (Haiti) and 
some are post-conflict countries (Sierra Leone). The Bank estimates that about 500 
million people live in such countries. As can be seen in Table VI, six out of the 
current 13 LICUS countries receive aid from Nordic donors. Sweden and Norway 
provide aid to five countries each. In contrast, Denmark gives to only one of these 
countries. Finland does not provide aid to any LICUS country. Sweden and Norway in 
this way differ significantly from the other two Nordic donors. 
On a parenthetical note, two important donors, Canada and the Netherlands, 
are often seen as different to the big five donors and more like the Nordic donors. Our 
regressions suggest that they are indeed different. Although they both give more aid to 
UN- friends, they seem to reward democracies (Netherlands) and penalise human 
rights violations (Canada). However, comparing the results for individual bilateral 
donors in Table IV, we cannot conclude that the Netherlands and Canada are like 
Nordic donors. Their patterns of giving vary considerably from the Nordics, 
particularly in comparison to Norway and Sweden. They should therefore not be 
treated as if they follow the same behavioural patterns as for example Alesina and 
Dollar (2000) assume. 
 
                                                 
11 World Bank (2003). Robustness Checks 
Cornett and Gibney (2004) provide two measures of human rights. One is based on 
information published by Amnesty International and the other on information by the 
US State Department. In the appendix, Table Va, we examine whether the results are 
sensitive to the use of the different human rights variables. The two variables are 
highly correlated (ρ=0.87) and the results are qualitatively similar. The main 
difference is that the human rights variable is not significant at the conventional levels 
for the Nordic donors (column 3). All other results remain unchanged. 
We also examined whether the results are sensitive to the selection of a 
particular time period. Due to a number of reasons, for example the end of the Cold 
War and a shift in donor behaviour from conditionality towards selectivity, one could 
hypothesize that aid allocations in the 1980s and those in the 1990s were motivated by 
different determinants. The study by Dollar and Levin (2004) suggests that donors 
have become more selective in the sense that during the 1980s aid was allocated 
indiscriminately to recipients with poor or good governance, but that donors have 
since shifted to assisting countries with good governance. In order to test this 
hypothesis we run our model on data for the 1980s and the 1990s separately. We 
could not confirm the hypothesis that donors have become more selective with respect 
to recipients￿ economic policy. With respect to democracy we could not find any 
change in donor behaviour either. However, the coefficient on human rights was 
insignificant for most donors in the 1980s but was significant for a number of donors 
in the 1990s.
12 Thus, we cannot confirm that donors￿ behaviour changed significantly 
over the past 20 years, possibly with the exception of being more sensitive to the 
recipients￿ human rights record. 
One further econometric issue is that the aid allocation regressions are not 
independent of each other. It may be the case that aid allocations are positively or 
negatively correlated. Donors may follow other donors and support certain recipients 
or perhaps decide to give aid to recipients who do not receive aid from other donors. 
Aid allocations may be complements or substitutes and thus not independent of each 
other. To investigate this possibility we used the method of Seemingly Unrelated 
                                                 
12 Multi, DAC and Nordic donors, Denmark, France (p=0.104), France, Japan and Canada. For 
Germany the human rights variable is significant in both periods, but only at the ten percent level in the 
1980s. In the 1990s the variable is significant at the one percent level. Regressions (SURE). We present these results in Table VIII. In the first block we 
allow the error terms of the multi- and bi-lateral aid allocations to be correlated. The 
correlation coefficient is 0.79 and we can reject the hypothesis that this correlation is 
zero. However, the regression coefficients are similar to our OLS estimates and our 
results are qualitatively unchanged. We arrive at the same conclusion when we allow 
for correlation between the error terms of the multilateral allocation, the DAC 
bilateral allocation (excluding Nordic donors) and the Nordic donors. Again, we can 





The Nordic development assistance programs have earned a reputation for their 
generosity as well as their commitment to human rights and democracy. In our paper 
we examine whether this reputation is deserved. First, we find that Nordic donors, 
with the exception of Finland, are relatively generous in the provision of aid. Norway, 
Denmark and Sweden are among the few countries to fulfil the UN target of giving at 
least 0.7 percent of their GNI as aid. Nordic donors give to poor countries, many of 
which are Sub-Saharan African. Relatively little of their aid is tied (Denmark is an 
exception) and they concentrate on social infrastructure provision, mainly in the 
health sector. Relatively little of their aid is channelled through multilateral agencies 
and the amount channelled through NGOs is negligible.  
We then address the question whether Nordic donors differ in their aid 
allocation patterns by comparing how much aid donors give and to which recipient 
countries. Using a global panel data set we find that individual bilateral donors vary 
considerably from one another. Nordic aid distribution differs significantly from other 
bilateral aid donor patterns: Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland provide more aid 
to democracies but do not penalise poor trade policies. We also find some evidence 
that recipients with a good human rights record receive more aid from Nordic donors. 
Unlike any of the other DAC donors, Nordic donors do not give more aid to political 
allies. Nordic aid allocation seems remarkably free from self-interest and, indeed, 
more orientated towards their stated objectives of poverty alleviation, the promotion 
of democracy and human rights. Norway and Sweden serve as leaders in these regards. One slight exception may be Finland, which more recently has provided more 
aid to recipients in its region (mainly Russia and Estonia) rather than to very poor 
developing countries. 
Bilateral donors have multiple objectives and in this study we confirm that 
bilateral donors￿ aid allocations differ significantly. Our emphasis is largely on 
describing who gives aid to whom but we do not prescribe who should receive aid.
13 
Aid is most effective in recipient countries with good governance and strong 
institutions. In the past donors tried to buy policy reform by attaching conditions to 
aid packages; however, in general conditionality did not achieve the desired 
objectives. Conditionality did not bring about lasting reform if there was no strong 
domestic movement for change. Weak domestic ownership and an unwillingness of 
donors to withdraw assistance in cases of non-compliance are the most often cited 
causes behind the failure of conditionality.
14 The work by Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
suggested selectivity as a new strategy; donors should give aid to recipients with good 
policies because only in good policy environments will aid be growth enhancing. The 
study by Burnside and Dollar received considerable attention and criticism. Hansen 
and Tarp (2001) and Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004) mainly base their criticism on 
the econometric shortcomings.  
A bigger criticism of the Burnside and Dollar article is a policy critique. If aid 
is mainly allocated to select countries with good policies, this implies that donors 
should disengage from countries with bad governance and poor institutions. Yet, if 
donors want to make progress on the Millenium Development Goals and combat the 
adverse regional and global consequences generated by LICUS, disengagement is not 
an option. Donor engagement in these countries must be different to the average poor 
country and should be tailored to the specific situation. Increasing funding is not 
enough because government delivery mechanisms are poor. Instead the emphasis 
should be on an indirect, but catalytic role in building the ownership of reforms in 
societies. This may include supporting civil society groups, independent think tanks 
and distribution of information. A focused reform agenda should be developed and 
agreed upon, the success of early reforms improves the chances of a larger future 
reform agenda. A further step would consist of strategic capacity building which 
                                                 
13 McGillivray (2004) provides a detailed discussion of descriptive and prescriptive approaches. 
14 For a further discussion see Collier (1997) and World Bank (1998). could include secondments from IFIs and bilateral donors as well as the mobilization 
of expertise in the diaspora community. In addition the operational challenge of 
delivering services to poor people needs to be tackled. Since these countries do not 
provide strong authorizing environments for incurring debt liabilities the World Bank 
should not be the major development agency in LICUS. Bilateral donors, the EU and 
UNDP are grant making agencies and are therefore most likely to provide assistance 
to LICUS countries. These recent changes in the development agenda could enable 
Nordic donors to use their deservedly excellent reputation to initiate and help to 
design reforms, assist with capacity building and service delivery in LICUS. Norway 
and Sweden, in particular, already give aid to about half of these cases. These two 
donors are presented with an exciting opportunity to take the (joint) lead in some of 
these countries and help to develop the LICUS programme. 5. References 
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 % GNI 
ODA 
per Capita 
Total 39943.8  100  na     
DAC 26140.3  65.4  100     
Multilateral 13406.4  33.6  na     
Nordics 2313.1  5.8  8.8    
Japan 6891.2  17.3  26.4  0.25 55 
USA 3691.7  9.2  14.1  0.1  13 
France 3577.4  9.0  13.7  0.41  61 
Germany 2999.3  7.5  11.5  0.27  37 
UK 1481.8  3.7  5.7  0.26  25 
Netherlands 1347.8  3.4 5.2  0.8  86 
Denmark 765.8  1.9  2.9  0.99  144 
Sweden 718.6  1.8  2.7  0.74  81 
Canada 717.5  1.8  2.7  0.31 24 
Norway 652.8  1.6  2.5  0.87 147 
Australia 571.8  1.4  2.2  0.27  30 
Spain 567.0  1.4  2.2  0.24  14 
Italy 453.4  1.1  1.7  0.15  8 
Switzerland 435.5  1.1  1.7  0.31  61 
Austria 381.6  1.0  1.5  0.23 47 
Belgium 297.2  0.7  1.1  0.32  29 
Finland 175.9  0.4  0.7  0.32  34 
Portugal 132.8  0.3  0.5  0.25  13 
Ireland 96.7  0.2  0.4  0.31  26 
Luxembourg 68.1  0.2  0.3  0.62  160 
Greece 59.8  0.1  0.2  0.15 6 
New Zealand  56.5  0.1  0.2  0.27  15 
 
 Note: We used the US GDP deflator to convert the current net aid flows into 1995 constant US dollars. 
Aid figures are three year averages (1997-99). The difference between the total aid and the sum of 
multilateral and DAC Bilateral Flows is mainly accounted for by Arab donors. 
 
 Table III. Who Receives Aid ￿ Recipient Profile 
 













Tanzania 46.05  7.05  Tanzania  48.91  6.81 
Mozambique 44.75  6.85  Mozambique  42.91  5.97 
Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep.  35.14  5.38  South Africa  35.84  4.99 
Bosnia - Herzegovina  31.84  4.88  Viet Nam  32.50  4.52 
Zambia 30.61  4.69  BosniaHerzegovina    27.31  3.80 
Bangladesh 30.56  4.68  Ethiopia  27.27  3.79 
Uganda 26.82  4.11  Bangladesh  24.84  3.46 
Russia 25.39  3.89  Nicaragua  23.60  3.28 
Ethiopia 25.09  3.84  Angola  21.65  3.01 
Angola 21.38  3.28  Zimbabwe  19.59  2.73 
 
 










% of  
Finland’s ODA 
Tanzania 67.91  8.87  Russia  16.43  9.34 
Uganda 59.62  7.79  China  14.31  8.14 
Mozambique 40.88  5.34 Mozambique  11.72  6.67 
Bangladesh 40.28  5.26  Tanzania  10.31  5.86 
Viet Nam  36.31  4.74  Yugoslavia, Fed  8.27  4.70 
Ghana 35.60  4.65  BosniaHerzegovina  8.22  4.67 
Egypt 32.65  4.26  Nepal  8.06  4.58 
India 30.84  4.03  Nicaragua  7.81  4.44 
Burkina Faso  28.78  3.76  Viet Nam  7.80  4.44 
South Africa  26.99  3.52  Estonia  6.67  3.79 
Note: We used the US GDP deflator to convert the current net aid flows into 1995 constant US dollars. 
Aid figures are three year averages (1997-99).  Table III: Loans and Grants 
  Denmark Finland Norway Sweden   DAC   
Countries 
bilateral % of total  59.20  57.93  73.50  70.31  67.16 
multilateral % of total  40.85  42.31  26.50  29.69  32.84 
grants % of bilateral  99.71  118.67  98.61  99.74  89.56 
loans % of bilateral  0.29  -18.67  1.39  0.26  13.08 
Tied aid % of bilateral  29.2  15.3  0.9  1.9  26.34 
Technical co-operation % of bilateral  8.11  25.17  13.49  4.11  38.43 
Developmental food aid  % of bilateral  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  3.08 
Emergency and distress relief  % of bilateral  8.50  19.23  24.57  23.71  12.87 
Contributions to NGOs% of bilateral  0.68  1.75  0.00  8.92  3.39 
Administrative costs% of bilateral  8.41  6.29  6.75  7.87  8.99 
Notes: Tied aid are based on commitments (excluding technical co-operation and administrative costs). 
All figures are 1999 values. Data Source: OECD (2001). 
 
 
Table IV: Aid by Major Purposes 
Commitments 
 % of bilateral 
Denmark Finland  Norway Sweden TOTAL 
DAC 
Social and Administrative infrastructure  45.6  34.2  43.9  33.8  29.9 
     Education a)  1.2  7.4  10.4  5.8  10.7 
     of which: Basic education  0.1  0.2  6.5  2.9  1.2 
     Health   14  6.4  5.8  4.2  4.2 
     of which: Basic health  10.4  3.5  2.3  1.2  2 
     Population b)  0.1  0.5  2.1  2.7  1.8 
     Water supply and sanitation  20.1  4.6  3  3.6  4.1 
     Government and civil society  8.4  8.2  12.8  10.5  4.2 
     Other social infrastructure/service  1.9  7.2  9.8  7  4.9 
Economic  infrastructure  9.4 5.3 6.5  9 17.2 
     Transport and communications  6.6  1.1  1.7  3.4  8.7 
     Energy  2.5  3.6  3.1  2.6  4.6 
     Other  0.2  0.6  1.7  3  3.9 
Production  13.2 4.9  6.7 3.8 8.1 
     Agriculture  13.2  3.9  5.1  3.1  5.5 
    "Industry, mining and construction"  0  0.9  1.4  0.1  2.2 
     Trade and tourism  0  0.1  0.2  0.6  0.4 
Multisector 10  8.3  10  6.3  7.4 
Programme  assistance  1.7 1.4 0.5  1.8  6.9 
Debt relief c)  0  14.1  2.2  2.8  7.4 
Emergency  aid  0  18.3  21.5 23.6 11.1 
Administrative  expenses  10.2 6.7  5.5 7.9 5.9 
Unspecified  9.9 6.8 3.1  11  6.1 
TOTAL    100 100 100  100  100 
Notes: All figures are for 1999 and they provide percentages of bilateral aid commitments. 
a)  Including  students  and  trainees.        
b)  Population  and  reproductive  health.        
c) Including forgiveness of non-ODA debt. 
Source: OECD (2001) Table V: Aid Allocation by Donor 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
  Multi DAC  Nordic Norway Denmark Sweden Finland 
Ln  GDP -1.525  -1.054  -1.388  -1.149 -1.087  -0.759 -0.409 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.003)*** 
Ln Population  0.265  0.351  0.415  0.366  0.402  0.374  0.370 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Trade Policy  0.002  -0.000  0.042  0.032  0.037  0.050  0.042 
(BMP) (0.515)  (0.954)  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Democracy 0.047  0.060  0.129  0.139  0.075  0.133  0.058 
 (0.062)*  (0.056)*  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.024)**  (0.000)*** (0.015)** 
Human  Rights  -0.041  -0.106  -0.240  -0.017 -0.448  -0.041 0.137 
(AI)  (0.707)  (0.370)  (0.048)**  (0.879) (0.001)***  (0.760) (0.270) 
UN-friend        -1.667 0.610  -0.625 0.547 
        (0.123) (0.590)  (0.657) (0.585) 
Egypt 0.847  2.306  2.127  0.371  2.944 0.626  2.755 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.184)  (0.000)***  (0.064)* (0.000)*** 
Israel  -1.396  3.593 -1.115  -1.902 -1.631  -1.123 -1.189 
 (0.069)*  (0.000)*** (0.076)*  (0.002)***  (0.001)***  (0.223) (0.074)* 
SS-Africa -0.304 -0.249  0.093  0.057  0.141  -0.124  0.059 
  (0.199)  (0.413)  (0.799)  (0.866) (0.716)  (0.769) (0.837) 
Latin  America  0.292  0.240 -0.477  -0.389 -0.809  -0.562 -0.803 
  (0.405)  (0.580)  (0.157)  (0.228) (0.010)**  (0.116) (0.001)*** 
Catholic -0.580  -0.351  -0.899  -1.134 -1.388  -0.405 -0.729 
 (0.183)  (0.506)  (0.039)**  (0.005)*** (0.001)***  (0.425) (0.060)* 
Protestant  -1.079  -1.630  -2.340  -1.605 -2.806  -0.626 -1.263 
 (0.097)*  (0.059)*  (0.007)***  (0.065)*  (0.000)***  (0.537)  (0.056)* 
Muslim  0.260  0.046 -0.932  -1.391 -1.572  -0.781 -1.150 
 (0.270)  (0.861)  (0.016)**  (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.105) (0.001)*** 
Observations  296  296  301  290 270  290 288 
R-squared 0.594  0.422  0.519  0.488  0.467  0.323  0.397 
 
Note: OLS regressions with White corrected standard errors. P-values in parentheses, ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the one, five and ten percent level, respectively. Table V continued 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 USA  UK  France  Japan  Germany    Netherlands  Canada 
Ln GDP  -1.393  -0.820  -0.287  -0.681  -0.593  -0.992  -1.120 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.010)** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Ln Population  0.060  0.526  0.609  0.674  0.520  0.454  0.541 
 (0.603)  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Trade Policy  -0.045  -0.001  0.011  -0.021  0.004  0.021  0.010 
(BMP) (0.000)*** (0.754) (0.022)**  (0.000)***  (0.249)  (0.000)***  (0.089)* 
Democracy 0.124  0.058  0.011  -0.000  0.077  0.123  0.022 
 (0.003)*** (0.024)** (0.613)  (0.993)  (0.001)*** (0.000)***  (0.440) 
Human Rights  0.131  -0.033  -0.117  -0.193  -0.031  0.059  -0.346 
(AI) (0.456)  (0.780)  (0.176)  (0.091)*  (0.726)  (0.601)  (0.004)*** 
UN-friend 2.621  2.399  3.706  6.133  5.073  1.668  2.929 
 (0.003)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.053)*  (0.002)*** 
Own colony  0.598  0.574  0.777  0.000  0.137  0.812   
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (.)  (0.146)  (0.000)***   
Other colony  0.082  -0.029  0.136  0.165  0.038  0.229   
 (0.441)  (0.691)  (0.014)**  (0.022)**  (0.481)  (0.000)***   
Egypt 4.735  0.163  2.559  0.650  1.937 1.983  1.464 
 (0.000)*** (0.670) (0.000)*** (0.008)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Israel 3.282  -4.812  0.218  -1.470  2.147  0.811  -1.057 
 (0.006)*** (0.000)*** (0.700) (0.025)**  (0.001)*** (0.090)*  (0.143) 
SS-Africa -0.267 -0.398 0.342  -1.513 0.265  0.143  -0.473 
 (0.595)  (0.159)  (0.141)  (0.000)***  (0.310)  (0.656)  (0.132) 
Latin America  0.827  -0.582  -0.150  0.251  0.019  0.751  0.603 
 (0.160)  (0.052)*  (0.599)  (0.404)  (0.952)  (0.022)**  (0.059)* 
Catholic 0.403  -0.550  1.045 -1.059  0.012  -0.237  -1.022 
 (0.566)  (0.133)  (0.004)*** (0.005)***  (0.971)  (0.553)  (0.011)** 
Protestant -0.307 -0.890 -1.716  -1.716 -1.180  -1.916  -0.346 
 (0.764)  (0.247)  (0.002)*** (0.012)**  (0.034)**  (0.007)***  (0.668) 
Muslim 0.635  -1.063  0.432  -0.848  0.161  -0.868  -0.535 
 (0.205)  (0.001)*** (0.105) (0.009)***  (0.537)  (0.010)**  (0.116) 
Observations 259  286  289  284  286  287  290 
R-squared 0.456  0.661  0.721  0.607  0.563  0.521  0.504 
 
Note: OLS regressions with White corrected standard errors. P-values in parentheses, ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the one, five and ten percent level, respectively. All regressions include time 
dummies. Table VI. Nordic Aid to LICUS (Low Income Countries Under Stress)
15 
 
LICUS pilot countries (03/04)  Donor (rank) average 01/02 
Angola  Norway (5), Sweden (7) 
Guinea-Bissau Sweden  (6) 
Haiti  
Liberia  
Papua New Guinea   
Somalia  Norway (4), Sweden (8) 
Sudan  Norway (5),  Sweden (10) 
Tajikistan  
Zimbabwe  Denmark (6), Norway (8), Sweden (9) 
Comoros  




                                                 
15 LICUS as defined by the World Bank (2004). Table VII: Tobit Results 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
  Multi DAC  Nordic Norway Denmark Sweden Finland 
Ln  GDP -1.530  -1.059  -1.485  -1.401 -1.360  -0.948 -0.534 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Ln Population  0.263  0.349  0.436  0.432  0.479  0.444  0.430 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Trade Policy  0.002  -0.000  0.042  0.035  0.041  0.054  0.044 
(BMP) (0.796)  (0.966)  (0.001)***  (0.003)*** (0.005)***  (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
Democracy 0.048  0.061  0.137  0.156  0.101  0.157  0.085 
 (0.034)**  (0.020)**  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.010)***  (0.000)*** (0.006)*** 
Human  Rights  -0.038  -0.104  -0.234  -0.031 -0.443  -0.015 0.164 
AI  (0.664)  (0.307)  (0.049)**  (0.786) (0.003)***  (0.922) (0.160) 
UN-friend       -0.984  1.764  0.376  1.332 
        (0.374) (0.208)  (0.833) (0.350) 
Egypt 0.861  2.321  2.199  0.512  3.243 0.779  2.823 
 (0.134)  (0.001)*** (0.005)*** (0.480)  (0.000)***  (0.433) (0.000)*** 
Israel  -1.393  3.598 -0.952  -1.858 -2.433  -0.298 -0.859 
 (0.025)**  (0.000)*** (0.255)  (0.040)**  (0.058)*  (0.829) (0.453) 
SS-Africa -0.286 -0.231  0.130  0.057  0.298  -0.156  0.126 
  (0.253)  (0.420)  (0.698)  (0.857) (0.470)  (0.722) (0.697) 
Latin  America  0.323  0.271 -0.331  -0.221 -0.672  -0.434 -0.786 
  (0.221)  (0.373)  (0.343)  (0.513) (0.120)  (0.351) (0.025)** 
Catholic -0.611  -0.381  -1.012  -1.219 -1.515  -0.602 -0.794 
 (0.065)*  (0.323)  (0.022)**  (0.005)*** (0.004)***  (0.308) (0.072)* 
Protestant  -1.131  -1.686  -2.482  -1.708 -3.519  -0.652 -1.387 
 (0.043)**  (0.009)*** (0.001)*** (0.019)**  (0.000)***  (0.514) (0.063)* 
Muslim  0.260  0.047 -0.970  -1.494 -1.742  -0.880 -1.096 
 (0.363)  (0.889)  (0.012)**  (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.087)* (0.004)*** 
Observations  296  296  301  290 270  290 288 
 
Note: Tobit regressions. P-values in parentheses, ***, ** and * denote significance at the one, five and 
ten percent level, respectively. 
 
 Table VIII: SURE Results 
 
                         (1)                                          (2) 
 Multi  DAC    Multi  DAC   
non Nordic 
Nordic 
Ln GDP  -1.497  -1.047    -1.495  -1.042  -1.286 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)***   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Ln Population  0.272  0.349    0.270  0.339  0.428 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)***   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Trade Policy  0.003  -0.000    0.003  -0.003  0.042 
(BMP) (0.760)  (0.971)    (0.749)  (0.781) (0.000)*** 
Democracy 0.049  0.064    0.054  0.065  0.140 
 (0.026)**  (0.014)**    (0.013)**  (0.011)**  (0.000)*** 
Human Rights  -0.039  -0.103    -0.057  -0.111  -0.240 
 (0.647)  (0.304)    (0.494)  (0.265)  (0.038)** 
Egypt 0.848  2.320    0.882  2.346 2.192 
 (0.126)  (0.000)***   (0.106)  (0.000)***  (0.003)*** 
Israel -1.523  3.556    -1.557  3.585 -1.388 
 (0.012)**  (0.000)***   (0.009)***  (0.000)***  (0.088)* 
SS-Africa -0.298  -0.235    -0.283  -0.276  0.238 
 (0.220)  (0.411)    (0.236)  (0.331)  (0.469) 
Latin America  0.223  0.231    0.249  0.218  -0.348 
 (0.387)  (0.449)    (0.326)  (0.469)  (0.317) 
Catholic -0.639  -0.342   -0.614  -0.301  -1.128 
 (0.048)**  (0.369)    (0.054)*  (0.425)  (0.010)*** 
Protestant -1.223  -1.661    -1.280  -1.648  -2.437 
 (0.023)**  (0.009)***   (0.016)**  (0.009)***  (0.001)*** 
Muslim 0.165  0.048   0.161  0.085  -1.055 
 (0.554)  (0.884)    (0.557)  (0.794)  (0.005)*** 












Note: Zellner￿s seemingly unrelated regressions. P-values in parentheses, ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the one, five and ten percent level, respectively. Appendix 
 
Donor Countries: 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) consists of the following 22 member 
countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 




Part I (Developing Countries and Territories),  
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Anguilla, Antigua snd Barbuda, Argentina, 
Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, 
Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cayman Islands, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Comoros, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, 
Cyprus, C￿te d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Timor (East), 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ex-Yugoslavia, 
Falkland Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Gibraltar, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, 
China, India, Indonesia, Indus Basin, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakstan, 
Kenya, Kiribati, Korea, Democratic Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Macao, Macedonia (former Yugoslav 
Republic), Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mekong Delta Project, Mexico, Micronesia, 
Fed.States, Moldova, Mongolia, Montserrat, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, 
Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Nicaragua, Niger, 
Nigeria, Niue, Northern Marianas Ilands., Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Palestinian 
Administrated Areas, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Qatar, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa , Sri 
Lanka, St. Helena, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Gr., Sudan, Suriname, 
Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tokelau, Tonga, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, Uganda, 
United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Virgin 
Islands (U.K.), Wallis and Futuna, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of  Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. 
 
Part II (More Advanced Developing Countries and Territories, CEECs and 
NISs) 
Bahamas*, Bermuda**, Brunei**, Cayman Islands**, Chinese Taipei**, Cyprus**,  
Falkland Islands**, Hong Kong,  Israel**, Kuwait*, Qatar*, Singapore*, United Arab 
Emirates*,  Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,  Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic and  Ukraine. 
 
Note: Countries marked * (**) countries transferred to Part II of the list of recipients 
on 1
st January 1996 (1
st January 1997). 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Obs  Mean      Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
ln aid Multi  295  3.994493      1.691126  -2.302585  7.499106 
ln aid DAC  295  4.981449      1.642774  -2.302585  8.046826 
ln aid Nordic  301  1.388836      2.067621  -2.746202  5.783576 
ln aid Norway  300  .1258485      1.871366  -3.267433  4.434826 
ln aid Denmark  281  .0244244        2.1202  -6.242906  4.502431 
ln aid Sweden  300  .1616112      2.046517  -2.302585  4.742642 
ln aid Finland  298  -.7686568      1.657275  -3.286446  3.916511 
ln aid USA  266  2.652011      2.248561  -2.302585  7.539036 
ln aid UK  296  1.08997      2.067972  -2.688248  5.417122 
ln aid France  299  2.279297      1.802724  -2.302585  6.239629 
ln aid Japan  293  2.789519      1.978212  -2.302585  7.039991 
ln aid Germany  294  2.990328      1.467749  -2.302585  6.384249 
ln aid Netherlands  297  1.399527      1.784591  -2.302585  5.026023 
ln aid Canada  300  1.31594      1.740259  -2.302585  4.843287 
ln GDP  301  7.492099      .8610504  5.700444  9.904387 
(ln GDP)
2  301  56.87049      13.08573  32.49506  98.09689 
ln Population  301  16.22056      1.515608  13.24458  20.91389 
BMP  301  109.7522      701.5169  -89.16  11662.38 
Democracy  301  3.033223      3.743291  0  10 
UN-friend UK  290  .171524      .2066543  -.2614399  .9453666 
UN-friend US  290  -.3878603      .3399373  -.8622133  .8511644 
UN-friend France  290  .297018      .1528049  -.1190089  .918759 
UN-friend Japan  290  .6968468      .1357362  .2490123  1 
UN-friend Germany  290  .4980488      .1776126  -.0526277  1 
UN-friend Sweden  290  .8333317      .1047406  .1643767  1 
UN-friend Finland  290  .8332932      .1159606  .1581469  1 
UN-friend Norway  290  .6881542      .1069672  .1435359  1 
UN-friend Denmark  290  .6747575      .0969902  .1675813  .9809415 
UN-friend Netherlands  290  .5099341      .1355987  .0410541  1 
UN-friend Canada  290  .527515      .1638131  -.1033741  1 
Human Rights AI  301  2.954873      .8966183  1  5 
Human Rights US  301  2.728405      .9293629  1  5 
Catholic  301  .3452824      .3633995  0  .966 
Protestant  301  .1151296      .1532783  0  .715 
Muslim  301  .285711      .3738647  0  .998 
 Correlation Coefficients 
  ln aid Multi   ln aid DAC  ln aid Nordic   ln GDP  (ln GDP)
2 Ln  Pop.  BMP   
ln aid DAC  0.7333  1.0000           
ln aid Nordic  0.6629  0.6134  1.0000         
ln GDP  -0.6633  -0.3359  -0.4822  1.0000       
(ln GDP)
2 -0.6776  -0.3507  -0.4930  0.9977  1.0000     
ln Population  0.3685  0.4274  0.3749  -0.0040  -0.0118  1.0000   
BMP -0.0120  -0.0294  0.0851  -0.0044  -0.0081  -0.0185  1.0000 
Democracy -0.1316  0.0722  0.0404  0.3497  0.3367  0.0292  -0.0744 
UN-friend UK  -0.0749  -0.0062  -0.1177  0.1537  0.1567  -0.0861  -0.1375 
UN-friend US  -0.1793  -0.0314  -0.2274  0.1428  0.1488  -0.1286  -0.0780 
UN-friend France  -0.0353  0.0282  -0.0864  0.1210  0.1214  -0.0796  -0.1365 
UN-friend Japan  0.1239  0.0359  -0.0179  0.0081  0.0039  -0.0439  -0.1602 
UN-friend Germany  0.0046  0.0237  0.0563  0.1639  0.1643  0.0059  -0.1422 
UN-friend Sweden  0.3254  0.1751  0.0941  -0.2682  -0.2795  -0.1225  -0.0123 
UN-friend Finland  0.2822  0.1085  0.0545  -0.2639  -0.2735  -0.1282  0.0250 
UN-friend Norway  0.1936  0.1534  0.0128  -0.0533  -0.0596  -0.1037  -0.1434 
UN-friend Denmark  0.2269  0.2099  0.0442  -0.0640  -0.0716  -0.1156  -0.1391 
UN-friend Netherl.  0.0230  0.0583  -0.0913  0.0745  0.0735  -0.1293  -0.1409 
UN-friend  Canada 0.0561  0.0819  -0.0064  0.0999  0.0996 -0.0650 -0.1905 
Human Rights AI  0.2044  0.2198  0.0605  -0.0182  -0.0227  0.4810  0.0820 
Human Rights US  0.2656  0.2237  0.2061  -0.1527  -0.1580  0.4893  0.1630 
   












UN-friend UK  0.1772  1.0000           
UN-friend US  0.0467  0.8567  1.0000         
UN-friend France  0.2008  0.9677  0.8029  1.0000       
UN-friend Japan  0.0876  0.8119  0.5753  0.7772  1.0000     
UN-friend 
Germany 
0.3009 0.5846 0.2267 0.6171  0.4602 1.0000  
UN-friend 
Sweden 
-0.0585 0.1050  -0.0340 0.1920 0.4229  -0.1314 1.0000 
UN-friend 
Finland 
-0.1371 0.0472  -0.0133 0.1133 0.3592  -0.3000 0.9692 
UN-friend 
Norway 
0.1544 0.7232 0.4485 0.7511  0.8825 0.4268 0.6860 
UN-friend 
Denmark 
0.1998 0.5589 0.2433 0.6236  0.7235 0.4211 0.7621 
UN-friend 
Netherlands 
0.1759 0.9467 0.7554 0.9669  0.8533 0.5792 0.3633 
UN-friend 
Canada 
0.2575 0.8454 0.5199 0.8075  0.8696 0.7319 0.2151 
Human Rights AI  -0.0605  -0.0688  -0.0441  -0.0870  -0.0334  -0.0140  -0.1074 
Human Rights 
US 















Rights US UN-friend 
Norway 
0.5833 1.0000           
UN-friend 
Denmark 
0.6389 0.9493  1.0000        
UN-friend 
Netherlands 
0.2782 0.8710  0.7610 1.0000       
UN-friend  Canada  0.0848 0.8364  0.7392 0.8559  1.0000    
Human Rights AI  -0.1050  -0.0674  -0.0726  -0.0886  -0.0252  1.0000   
Human Rights US  -0.1386  -0.1640  -0.1309  -0.2278  -0.1036  0.8665  1.0000 
 Table Va: Aid Allocation by Donor (US State Department Human Rights data) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
  Multi DAC  Nordic Norway Denmark Sweden Finland 
Ln  GDP -1.552  -1.188  -1.344  -1.104 -1.026  -0.664 -0.350 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.001)*** (0.009)*** 
Ln Population  0.279  0.376  0.426  0.366  0.390  0.374  0.362 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Trade Policy  0.005  0.003  0.042  0.031  0.039  0.047  0.039 
(BMP) (0.223)  (0.684)  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Democracy 0.047  0.051  0.117  0.132  0.059  0.119  0.054 
 (0.061)*  (0.104)  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.082)*  (0.001)*** (0.022)** 
Human Rights  -0.168  -0.226  -0.151  0.012  -0.312  0.051  0.163 
  (0.128)  (0.064)*  (0.195)  (0.911) (0.031)**  (0.692) (0.157) 
UN-friend        -1.685 0.298  -0.762 0.548 
        (0.120) (0.798)  (0.572) (0.585) 
Egypt 0.800  2.178  2.125  0.351  2.961 0.685  2.781 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.206)  (0.000)***  (0.045)** (0.000)*** 
Israel  -1.450  3.733 -1.150  -1.933 -1.886  -1.171 -1.158 
 (0.051)*  (0.000)*** (0.061)*  (0.001)***  (0.000)***  (0.193) (0.074)* 
SS-Africa -0.403 -0.467  0.219  0.067  0.313  0.031  0.075 
  (0.050)*  (0.092)*  (0.526)  (0.831) (0.388)  (0.938) (0.781) 
Latin  America  0.193  0.028 -0.259  -0.309 -0.631  -0.314 -0.741 
  (0.531)  (0.944)  (0.390)  (0.282) (0.028)**  (0.306) (0.001)*** 
Catholic -0.399  -0.107  -1.099  -1.221 -1.607  -0.574 -0.750 
 (0.303)  (0.826)  (0.007)***  (0.001)*** (0.000)***  (0.239) (0.041)** 
Protestant  -1.164  -1.513  -2.364  -1.668 -2.959  -0.951 -1.430 
 (0.057)*  (0.063)*  (0.003)***  (0.042)**  (0.000)***  (0.313)  (0.024)** 
Muslim  0.310  0.100 -0.996  -1.387 -1.717  -0.811 -1.118 
 (0.179)  (0.703)  (0.008)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.083)* (0.002)*** 
Observations  308  308  313  301 281  301 299 
R-squared 0.599  0.447  0.531  0.492  0.462  0.318  0.400 
 
Note: OLS regressions with White corrected standard errors. P-values in parentheses, ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the one, five and ten percent level, respectively. Table Va continued ￿ 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 USA  UK  France  Japan  Germany    Netherlands  Canada 
Ln GDP  -1.272  -0.788  -0.304  -0.742  -0.617  -0.951  -1.111 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.008)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Ln Population  0.015  0.537  0.623  0.713  0.566  0.468  0.567 
 (0.893)  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Trade Policy  -0.049  -0.002  0.013  -0.018  0.006  0.019  0.013 
(BMP) (0.000)*** (0.666) (0.002)*** (0.000)***  (0.107)  (0.000)***  (0.029)** 
Democracy 0.121  0.043  0.008  -0.026  0.070  0.104  0.003 
 (0.002)*** (0.084)* (0.695)  (0.279)  (0.003)*** (0.000)***  (0.915) 
Human Rights  0.198  -0.091  -0.166  -0.278  -0.092  0.064  -0.327 
 (0.263)  (0.471)  (0.042)**  (0.022)**  (0.297)  (0.572)  (0.005)*** 
UN-friend 2.637  2.327  3.674  6.083  5.008  1.657  2.634 
 (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.061)*  (0.007)*** 
Own colony  0.580  0.536  0.794  0.000  0.158  0.785   
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (.)  (0.082)*  (0.000)***   
Other colony  0.063  -0.084  0.156  0.125  0.048  0.202   
 (0.517)  (0.253)  (0.003)*** (0.069)*  (0.366)  (0.000)***   
Egypt 4.842  0.099  2.550  0.547  1.939 1.993  1.492 
 (0.000)*** (0.782) (0.000)*** (0.022)**  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Israel 3.108  -4.713  0.142  -1.281  2.284  0.980  -1.095 
 (0.009)*** (0.000)*** (0.784) (0.045)**  (0.000)*** (0.035)**  (0.074)* 
SS-Africa -0.182 -0.296 0.336  -1.484 0.317  0.229  -0.339 
 (0.695)  (0.286)  (0.127)  (0.000)***  (0.212)  (0.460)  (0.258) 
Latin America  0.747  -0.492  -0.115  0.387  0.161  0.927  0.820 
 (0.153)  (0.077)*  (0.658)  (0.180)  (0.577)  (0.003)***  (0.007)*** 
Catholic 0.411  -0.603  1.038 -1.210  0.013  -0.376  -1.179 
 (0.509)  (0.083)*  (0.002)*** (0.001)***  (0.968)  (0.332)  (0.003)*** 
Protestant -0.985 -1.078 -1.887  -1.413 -1.293  -2.036  -0.681 
 (0.338)  (0.120)  (0.000)*** (0.030)**  (0.014)**  (0.002)***  (0.380) 
Muslim 0.595  -0.921  0.374  -0.836  0.160  -0.849  -0.670 
 (0.232)  (0.004)*** (0.136) (0.008)***  (0.533)  (0.014)**  (0.045)** 
Observations 270  297  300  295  297  298  301 
R-squared 0.438  0.644  0.736  0.620  0.589  0.532  0.515 
Note: OLS regressions with White corrected standard errors. P-values in parentheses, ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the one, five and ten percent level, respectively. 
  Data Sources: 
 
Aid 
Average aid received in constant 1995 US Dollars (millions) over each five year 
period. Following Alesina and Dollar we added 0.1 to each observation before taking 
logarithms. Source: OECD 2001. 
 
Population 
Total population. Source: WDI 2001. 
 
Trade Policy (Black Market Premium) 
We measure openness to trade by taking the parallel (￿black￿) market premium. In 
order to make the coefficients easier to compare we multiplied the premium by 100. 
Source: Global Development Network. www.worldbank.org\research\gdn 
 
Democracy 
We used the democracy score from the Polity IV data set which measures openness of 
political institutions on a scale of 1 to 10, with higher values indicating more 
democratic regimes. For further documentation see Jaggers and Gurr (1995). 
 
Human Rights 
We use two measures of human rights violations, one is based on information 
published by Amnesty International the other is based on US State Department 
information. The index ranges from 1 to 5, with higher values indicating worse human 
rights. Source: Cornett and Gibney, 2004. 
 
UN-friends 
Based on UN voting patterns, the UN-friend index ranges from -1 to 1, with higher 
values indicating more similar voting patterns. Source: Gartzke and Jo (2000). 
 
Religious Affiliations 
Catholic, Protestant and Muslim denote the percentage of the population in a country 
who declared in a survey that they follow a particular religion. We used data from 
1980. Source: Barratt (1982) 
 
Colonies 
Dummies indicate whether a recipient was a former colony. Source: Burnside and 
Dollar (2000).  
 
Regions 
Regional dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America were taken from 
Burnside and Dollar (2000). 
 
 
 